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Regulations that restrict pollution by firms also affect decisions about use of labor and capital.  They
thus affect relative factor prices, total production, and output prices.  For non-revenue-raising environmental
mandates, what are the general equilibrium impacts on the wage, the return to capital, and relative
output prices?   Perhaps surprisingly, we cannot find any existing analytical literature addressing that
question.  This paper starts with the standard two-sector tax incidence model and modifies one sector
to include pollution as a factor of production that can be a complement or substitute for labor or for
capital.  We then look not at taxes but at four types of mandates, and for each mandate determine conditions
that place more of the burden on labor or on capital.  Stricter regulation does not always place less
burden on the factor that is a better substitute for pollution.  Also, a relative restriction on the amount
of pollution per unit of output creates an "output-subsidy effect" on factor prices that can offset and
reverse the traditional output effect and substitution effect.  An analogous effect is found for a relative
restriction on pollution per unit of capital.
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heutel@fas.harvard.eduMuch literature compares the efficiency properties of environmental policies, 
generally finding that incentives like taxes or permits are more cost-effective than 
mandates – at least in the case where firms are heterogeneous and government cannot 
tailor mandates to each firm.  In contrast, the literature on the distributional effects of 
such policies is limited.  Some papers identify demographic characteristics or locations of 
households in jurisdictions that are differentially affected by environmental protection, 
while others look at the burdens on households that buy products made more expensive 
by those regulations.
1  All of these papers ignore effects of environmental policies on the 
wage rate and the return to capital – both of which also affect real incomes.  Yet, 
restrictive command and control (CAC) regulations can simultaneously affect both the 
product prices and factor prices. 
Of course, the public economics literature since Harberger (1962) is replete with 
analytical general equilibrium studies of the incidence of taxation.  A few papers look at 
the incidence of environmental taxes, where the question is about how the burden of 
collecting the revenue is distributed.
2  Mandates do not have revenue whose burden can 
be distributed.  Yet CAC mandates clearly interfere with firms' decisions about use of 
labor, use of capital, the amount to produce, and the price to charge.  We therefore find it 
surprising that we cannot find any analytical general equilibrium model of the incidence 
of non-revenue-raising environmental regulations, with simultaneous effects on the 
sources side of income (relative factor prices) and the uses side (product prices).
3   
To begin such a literature, this paper starts with rudimentary models in the style 
of Harberger (1962), with two competitive sectors and constant returns to scale, but we 
add the important complication that the "dirty" sector uses three inputs to production: 
labor, capital, and pollution.  Thus, any two of these inputs can be complements or 
substitutes.  The "clean" sector uses only labor and capital, which are in fixed supply but 
                                                 
1 Examples in the first category include Becker (2004) or Sieg et al (2004).  Those in the second category 
include Gianessi and Peskin (1980), Robison (1985), Metcalf (1999), or West and Williams (2004). 
2 The incidence of a pollution tax is studied by e.g. Yohe (1979), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997), Chua 
(2003), and Fullerton and Heutel (2007). 
3 In a trade model with fixed output prices, Das and Das (2007) show the effect on factor prices from one 
type of mandate (a pollution quota).  Here, we find both factor prices and output prices in a closed economy 
for four types of mandate.  Yet results would differ in open economy.  Computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models calculate effects of regulations on factor prices as well as goods prices, including Hazilla 
and Kopp (1990), Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990), Goulder et al (1997), Burtraw et. al. (2001), and Fischer 
and Fox (2004).  These CGE studies can provide elaborate simulations with numerical magnitudes.  Some 
include simple analytical models.  But none provide general analytical models with closed form solutions 





perfectly mobile between sectors.  We then solve models representing four types of non-
revenue-raising policies: the handout of pollution permits, a restriction on the "absolute" 
quantity of pollution, a "relative" standard on pollution per unit of output, and a relative 
standard on pollution per unit of an input (such as capital).   
We start with results for permits and quotas, because they are easy to understand.  
First, they restrict the amount of pollution, so they create scarcity rents.  The incidence of 
these scarcity rents may be fairly obvious: gains accrue to whatever entity is handed the 
permits or the rights to the restricted quantity of pollution.  And the incidence on labor or 
capital may be understood using two effects already identified by Mieszkowski (1967).  
First, the "substitution effect" raises the return to whichever factor is a better substitute 
for pollution (and injures the relative complement to pollution).  Second, the "output 
effect" reduces the return to whichever factor is used intensively in the regulated sector. 
We then extend the simple model to consider relative standards.  Often regulators 
limit the ratio of emissions to output, a restriction that firms can meet partly by reducing 
emissions in the numerator and partly by increasing output in the denominator.  We 
derive closed form solutions for each price change, and we identify an additional term we 
call the "output-subsidy effect".  This effect helps whichever factor is intensively used in 
the dirty sector, and it dominates the usual output effect under plausible conditions we 
identify.  The important point is that government-imposed costs on the dirty sector may 
place less burden on the factor intensively used there.  Finally, we model a restriction on 
the ratio of emissions to capital, where solutions are used to identify another new term we 
call the "capital-subsidy effect."  Since this restriction can be satisfied partly by increased 
use of capital, this effect tends to raise the relative return to capital (or, more generally, 
the return to any input in the denominator of the restricted ratio).  We also find effects on 
the output prices to show burdens on the uses side of income. 
Thus, we see standard principles of tax incidence at play, but we introduce other 
effects specific to mandates.  And this analysis can be applied beyond environmental 
policy to any restriction on use of inputs.  For example, our three inputs could be 
interpreted as labor, capital, and land.  Then agricultural policy may restrict use of land 
per unit output, or urban zoning rules may restrict building heights (capital per unit land). 
Section 1 reviews mandates in actual policymaking, and it reviews some of the 





permits, while Section 4 looks at absolute quotas.  We then turn to the main contributions 
of our paper.  Section 5 models a restriction on pollution per unit of output, and Section 6 
restricts pollution per unit input.  Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
1. Review of Environmental Mandates and Modeling 
  Since the earlier years of their existence, environmental regulations have most 
often been command-and-control (CAC) mandates rather than incentives like pollution 
taxes or tradable permits.  Those mandates, though, can take many forms for different 
industries.  Historically, the Water Quality Act of 1965 was the first national policy 
requiring that states set water quality standards, determine maximum discharge limits, 
and allocate non-tradable quotas.  Thus, it is an absolute quantity restriction.  Then the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 authorized the EPA to set effluent standards 
that are based on technological factors.  In this case, each facility faced restrictions based 
on the type of facility and perhaps on capital use or output. 
The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) set national ambient air quality 
standards, and states that do not meet them are forced to create specific implementation 
plans.  These plans often differ greatly from each other.  Modeling the Clean Air Act as a 
single limit on emissions is difficult, except perhaps for the national emissions standards 
for new facilities under the New Source Performance Standards of the 1970 CAAA.  Like 
the water standards, these air pollution regulations are technology-based, that is, 
determined by the current state of abatement technology. 
Tradable emissions permits are becoming more popular, including the 1990 
CAAA national market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, the market in the northeast for 
nitrogen oxide (NOX), the South Coast Air Quality Management District permit system 
for SO2 and NOX in the Los Angeles area launched in January 1994, and the seven states 
that have established emissions credit programs for NOX and volatile organic compounds 
(VOC) since 1989 under the EPA’s emissions trading framework.  These tradable permits 
may achieve the same net level of environmental benefits as technology mandates, and 
perhaps more cheaply, but they have important distributional differences. 
  While quotas and permits set the absolute quantity of emissions, other mandates 
set relative standards such emissions per unit of output or per unit of some input.  These 
policies may be seen as more reasonable than absolute limits per firm, especially when 





                                                
same level of emissions as a small firm.  By enacting a relative policy, the regulator can 
avoid deciding on a specific allocation of allowed emissions levels.  Because of the 
variety of mandates under different state implementation plans, it is difficult to pinpoint 
what policies have this relative form.  In a 1982 survey of regulators administered by 
Resources for the Future, however, 97% of air pollution regulating agencies and 100% of 
water pollution regulating agencies said they use limits on emissions per unit of some 
input, and 70% of air and 50% of water agencies said they use limits on emissions per 
unit output (Russell et al, 1986, p. 19).  Such large proportions suggest modeling some 
environmental policies as limits on ratios of pollution to output or to an input. 
Current environmental regulations are quite complex.  Title 40 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations lists hundreds of rules that apply to various emitters and industries, 
and most states have their own regulations.  Some requirements are described in terms of 
emissions per unit output, such as the VOC standard for automobile refinish coatings that 
is stated in grams per liter of coating.  For new producers of sulfuric acid, the emissions 
standard for SO2 is 2 kg per metric ton of acid produced.
4  The Texas Commission for 
Environmental Quality sets standards for hazardous waste generators that are based on 
the amount of output produced.
5  The state of New York sets limits on fluoride emissions 
per unit output from aluminum reduction plants.
6  Other countries also use relative 
standards.  In the European carbon permit market, some allocation mechanisms that have 
been proposed are based on the historical output of firms (Bohringer and Lange 2005). 
Mandates also take the form of emissions per unit of some input.  The federal 
standard for particulate matter emissions for fossil-fuel-fired steam generators is 43 
nanograms per joule of heat input derived from fossil fuel or wood residue.
7  Other   
standards are stated in terms of emissions per unit heat input in Texas for electric 
generators and solid fossil-fuel fired steam generators.
8  Even for a particular industry, 
emissions standards can differ based on the technology.  Emissions rates for iron and 
steel processes in New York depend on the technology of the plant.
9  Limits on SO2 
emissions for oil and gas producers in Texas are 25 tons/year per facility.
10  Standards 
 
4 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Chapter 1, §60.82. 
5 Texas Administrative Code, Title 30, Section 1, §335.69.  
6 New York Environmental Conservation Rules and Regulations §209.2.  
7 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Chapter 1, §60.42. 
8 Texas Administrative Code, Title 30, Section 1, §117.105 and §112.8. 
9 New York Environmental Conservation Rules and Regulations, §216.3. 





                                                
per facility also apply in New York for petroleum refineries.
11  Finally, we note that 
agricultural policies often limit the amount of nitrogen per hectare of land.  
We cannot incorporate all of these different types of mandates in a single model 
with clear analytical results.  We can, however, model a few types of mandates and 
compare results, to see their differential impacts.  For example, we model technology 
mandates and per facility standards as limits on the amount of pollution per unit capital.  
Our model can also be applied to other policies such as the limit on fertilizer per hectare, 
by reinterpreting our input of "capital" as input of "land". 
  The economics literature often uses a tax on pollution to summarize the effects of 
all environmental policies.  Some papers look at quotas or permits that restrict absolute 
amounts of pollution.  Yet actual policy rarely employs a pollution tax, and mandates 
typically restrict emissions per unit output or per unit of an input.  The few studies of 
relative standards are focused on economic efficiency, not distributional effects.
12   
The most exhaustive theoretical analysis of different environmental mandates is in 
Helfand (1991).  Her model contains a single consumption good produced using a "dirty" 
input that causes pollution and a "clean" one that abates pollution.  The various mandates 
considered are: a limit on emissions, a limit on output, an upper limit on the dirty input, a 
lower limit on the clean input, and limits on the ratio of emissions to output or the ratio of 
emissions to either input.  By normalizing all of these standards so that they result in the 
same abatement, she can compare their effects on output, each input, and firm profits.  
She finds that the output restriction most reduces input and output levels.  The restriction 
on pollution itself yields the highest firm profits.  In most cases, however, the signs of 
these changes depend on the form of the production function.  Some counterintuitive 
results are reached as well.  For instance, a standard per unit output may actually increase 
total emissions; the same result may occur from a standard limiting total output.
13
 
11 New York Environmental Conservation Rules and Regulations §223.3. 
12 Hochman and Zilberman (1978) model standards as limits on emissions per unit output or per unit input.  
Harford and Karp (1983) compare the two policies and find that a standard per unit output is more efficient 
than a standard per unit input.  Similarly, Thomas (1980) compares the welfare costs of different policies.  
Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) model a technology restriction as a limit per unit output.  Fredriksson et al 
(2004) model environmental policy as a limit on the energy-capital ratio, citing the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards.  None of these studies investigate distributional impacts. 
13 More recently, Jou (2004) compares quotas with emissions/output standards and finds that the former 
leads to less pollution.  Also, Goulder et al (1999) compare efficiency effects of environmental policies in 
the presence of distortionary taxes.  McKitrick (2001) solves for the efficiency costs of ratio standards.  





  While Helfand provides a number of valuable insights regarding the differences 
among various mandates, she does not address incidence.
14  In fact, her input supply 
curves are horizontal, so no policy can affect factor prices.  Furthermore, the two inputs 
are a clean and dirty input.  Even as these two input prices change, the implications are 
unclear for returns to labor and capital.  Here, we model production as using capital, 
labor, and pollution.  These inputs have endogenous prices, so we can capture the 
differential effects of environmental standards on their relative returns.  Which factors 
gain or lose can have a large effect on what policies are chosen (Keohane et al 1998). 
2. The Basic Model 
  Our model is similar to that in Fullerton and Heutel (2007), where we analyze a 
tax on emissions.  For ease of exposition, we start here with the simplest version where 
emissions,  Z,  have a price,  pZ.  This version is directly applicable to the first policy 
below (tradable permits).  We then explain changes necessary to model each mandate.  In 
this model, as in Harberger (1962), we assume a closed economy with many identical 
firms, perfect competition, fixed factor supplies, perfect mobility, and no uncertainty.  
We compare two equilibria rather than the transition period between them.
15  
  One sector produces a clean good  X,  with price pX,  in a constant returns to scale 
(CRS) production function using labor and capital,  X = X (KX, LX).  Totally differentiate 
this production function and the zero-profits condition, to get: 
   (1)  X XL X XK L K X ˆ ˆ ˆ θ θ + =
   (2)  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ X XL X XK X L w K r X p + + + = + θ θ
where a hat over any variable represents a proportional change (e.g.  X dX X ≡ ˆ ).  Also,  
w  is the wage, r  is the rate of return, and  θXi  is the share of production for factor  i  in 
sector  X  (e.g., θXK ≡ rKX/XpX ).  Then we use the definition of  σX,  the elasticity of 
substitution in production between capital and labor to get: 
                                                                                                                                                 
follows from increasingly high environmental goals.  See also Keohane et al (1998) for a similar model of 
policy choice.  Montero (2002) compares effects on R&D incentives, while Requate and Unold (2003) 
compare incentives to adopt abatement technology.  Bovenberg et al (2005) see how efficiency costs of 
mandates and taxes are affected by a constraint to avoid adverse industry-distributional effects.  
14 Helfand and House (1995) empirically estimate the costs of different environmental policies for lettuce 
growers in California’s Salinas Valley.  They find that mandates reduce farm profits less than do taxes. 
15 Using a CGE model, Goulder and Summers (1989) analyze transitions due to imperfect factor mobility.  





   (3)  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ r w L K X X X − = − σ
The other sector produces a dirty good  Y,  with price pY,  in a CRS production 
function,  Y = Y(KY, LY, Z).  Here, we use input demand equations for each of the three 
inputs based on all three input prices (r, w, and  pZ).  Differentiate the three input demand 
equations and use the fact that only two of the three are independent to get:
16
     (4)  Y p a w a r a K Z KZ KL KK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + =
     (5)  Y p a w a r a L Z LZ LL LK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + =
where  aij  is the elasticity of demand for factor  i  with respect to the price of factor  j.  
Allen (1938) shows that  aij = θYieij,  where  eij  is the Allen elasticity of substitution 
between inputs  i  and  j.  For this sector, differentiation of production and of the zero-
profits condition yield: 
  . (6)  Z L K Y YZ Y YL Y YK ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ θ θ θ + + =
     (7)    ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ Z p L w K r Y p Z YZ Y YL Y YK Y + + + + + = + θ θ θ
The resource constraint for capital is  KY + KY =K , where K  is the fixed total capital 
stock.  Differentiation of that and the analogous labor constraint yields:   
     (8)  0 ˆ ˆ = + KY Y KX X K K λ λ
   (9)  0 ˆ ˆ = + LY Y LX X L L λ λ
where  λij  is sector  j’s share of input  i  (e.g.  K K X KX ≡ λ ).  Finally, preferences are 
modeled using the definition of  σu,  the elasticity of substitution in utility: 
     (10)  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
X Y u p p Y X − = − σ
  The clean good is chosen as numeraire, so     is fixed at zero, and we have ten 
equations for eleven unknown changes:  .  For each 
policy below, we specify one more equation or exogenous policy change.  For example, 
an existing restriction on the number of permits implies an initial  p
X p ˆ
, ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
Y X Y X L L K KZ p Y p X r w Z Y ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
Z >0.  Then the 
authorities can reduce the number of permits by a small amount (e.g., Z ˆ = –0.01).  The 
                                                 
16 See Mieszkowski (1972) for an early use of this method.  Stability conditions for the input demand 





system (1)-(10) can then be used to solve for the ten remaining unknowns, by successive 
substitution.  The steps are omitted but may be requested from the authors.  Here, we 
report only the solutions for  r ˆ,   ,   ,  and   .  The first three of these determine the 
sources-side incidence of the policy, and the last determines the uses-side. 
w ˆ Z p ˆ Y p ˆ
 Because    X  is produced with no excess profit using only labor and capital, and its 
output price is fixed by assumption,  r  and  w  cannot both move in the same direction.  
If  r ˆ= = 0 , the implication is not that factors bear no burdens.  Rather, since  p w ˆ Y  may 
rise, r ˆ=w= 0  means that labor and capital bear real burdens in proportion to their shares 
of national income.    Hence, a positive value for  
ˆ
r ˆ  just means that capital bears a 
burden that is proportionally less than that of labor. 
3. Tradable Pollution Permits 
  Results for permits illustrate a few properties of our basic model, to set the stage 
for our main results regarding the incidence of relative standards.  The permit policy 
imposes costs by forcing firms to reduce emissions or to buy permits.  The mandated 
overall limit on pollution creates scarcity rents, however, and the distribution of those 
rents must be considered as part of the incidence.
17  If the permits are grandfathered to 
the firms, then their owners capture those scarcity rents.  In addition to evaluating 
changes in returns to capital and labor, our model solves for changes in permit-created 
scarcity rents.  All three of these price changes contribute to the sources-side incidence. 
  The general solutions are presented in Table 1, where we assume the denominator  
D  is positive.
18  The factor price equations demonstrate effects first identified by 
Mieszkowski (1967).  The first term in the curly brackets, σu(γK – γL),  is his "output 
effect": the policy   raises the cost of production and thus reduces output in a way 
that depends on consumer preferences  σ
0 ˆ < Z
u.  Then if  Y  is capital intensive, (γK – γL)>0, the 
output effect reduces  r  and raises  w.  The other terms represent a "substitution effect" 
                                                 
17 Parry (2004) uses a partial equilibrium model to calculate incidence, including the distribution of scarcity 
rents created by emissions permits for carbon, SOX, and NOX. 
18 The denominator is likely to be positive, except in perverse cases that are not the subject of this paper.  In 
the case with equal factor intensities (γK = γL = γ), for example, a sufficient condition is that all of the Allen 
cross-price elasticities are positive.  In fact, that condition is stronger than necessary; D is positive unless 
"Condition 1":    
) (
) ( ] ) ( ) ( [
G F A
Fe Ge A e e
e
YK XL
LL KK YK XL KZ YK XK LZ YL XL u YZ X
KL +
+ − + + + + −
<
θ θ
θ θ θ γ θ θ γ θ σ θ σ
. 
The right side of this inequality must be negative, so Condition 1 says that  eKL  is even more negative.  





involving the Allen elasticities.  If capital is a better substitute for pollution than is labor 
(eKZ > eLZ), then the restriction   is more likely to help capital.     0 ˆ < Z
 
 Table 1: Incidence of Absolute Quantity Restriction 
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  Next, in Table 1, the expression for   seems quite complicated, but the final 
term inside the curly brackets,  γ
Z p ˆ
L(1+γK )/A,  is unambiguously positive and could be 
called a "direct effect": it reflects a downward-sloping demand for emissions permits, so 
the leftward shift of the vertical supply curve tends to raise the equilibrium permit price.  
Then the long first term could be called the "indirect effect," but it need not be positive.  
If it is sufficiently negative, then a decrease in the total permit allocation may actually 
decrease the permit price.  The conditions under which this counterintuitive effect occurs 





Yet the effect is analogous to previous findings that an increase in the pollution tax can 
lead to an increase in emissions.
19
   Yet, unlike the incidence on labor and capital owners, the incidence on permit 
holders is not determined solely by the change in their factor price.  Labor and capital are 
in fixed total supply and earn net returns determined by  w  and  r,  but the supply of 
permits has just been restricted by the policy (Z ˆ  < 0).  The total return to permit holders 
is  pZ·Z,  and the proportional change in this product is  .  Even if the policy raises 
the price  p
Z pZ ˆ ˆ +
Z,  then permit holders are still not necessarily better off. 
  Furthermore, even the uses-side incidence result  ( )  is ambiguous.  The final 
term in the curly brackets is a "direct effect" on the cost of production, indicating that a 
decrease in the number of permits tends to increase the price of the dirty good.  However, 
the long previous term is an "indirect effect" that cannot be signed.  It allows for another 
counterintuitive result: reducing the number of emissions permits may hurt consumers of 
the clean good more than consumers of the dirty good.  To see if these ambiguities can be 
resolved, we next look at two special cases: equal factor intensities (to isolate the 
substitution effect), and no substitution in the dirty sector (to see the output effect). 
Y p ˆ
3.1 Equal Factor Intensities 
  Suppose that  γL  and  γK  are equal to each other, and let their common value be  
γ.  Note that this condition implies  LY/LX = KY/KX.  The output effect then disappears, 
and the substitution effect simplifies.  Unfortunately, this special case does little to 
simplify the long expressions for   and  , but for factor prices we have:  Z p ˆ Y p ˆ
   Z e e
D
r LZ KZ
XL YZ ˆ ) )( 1 ( ˆ − + − = γ γ
θ θ
     
   Z e e
D
w LZ KZ
XK YZ ˆ ) )( 1 ( ˆ − + = γ γ
θ θ
       
The denominator in the general solution reduces a bit, but  D>0  still requires Condition 1 
above.  If so, we reach a definitive conclusion about the effect of the regulation on  r  and  
                                                 
19 See DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) or Fullerton and Heutel (2007).  This example is comparable to the 
"Edgeworth Taxation Paradox" studied in Hotelling (1932), where the imposition of a tax on a good can 
reduce its price to consumers and increase their purchases.  Though Hotelling's model is not perfectly 
analogous to the one here, his inequalities (25) and (26) present conditions when the paradox holds; they 





w.  When emissions must be reduced, the dirty sector wants to substitute into both labor 
and capital, but if labor is a better substitute for pollution (eLZ > eKZ), then labor is hurt 
relatively less (i.e.   and   ).    0 ˆ < r 0 ˆ > w
3.2 No Substitution in Dirty Sector 
  We now let the factor intensities of the two sectors differ, but we assume the dirty 
sector cannot substitute among its inputs (eij = 0  for all  i, j).  While this assumption is 
clearly restrictive, it allows us to isolate the impact of factor intensities. The denominator  
D  then simplifies to  θYZσXσu, and the substitution effects in  r ˆ  and  w  disappear.  
Again   and   are not much simplified, but the changes in factor prices become: 
ˆ
Z p ˆ Y p ˆ
Z r L K
X
XL ˆ ) ( ˆ γ γ
σ
θ
− =  
Z w L K
X
XK ˆ ) ( ˆ γ γ
σ
θ
− − =  
Here, the denominator is always positive.  The sources side incidence includes only an 
output effect, determined by the sign of  γK – γL.  If the dirty sector is capital-intensive, 
this term is positive.  Since   ,  the rental rate falls and the wage rises.  The 
magnitude of this effect is mediated by  σ
0 ˆ < Z
X:  if the clean industry can easily substitute 
between capital and labor, then these effects on input prices become smaller, since the 
clean sector can more easily accommodate the additional labor or capital.    
4. Command and Control Restrictions on Firm-Specific Pollution Quantities 
  We started with tradable pollution permits above, because the permit market is 
easy to comprehend with a vertical supply, a downward-sloping demand, and many 
identical firms that each can buy as many permits as desired at the equilibrium market 
price  pZ.  Then all firms in the dirty industry have symmetric demands for the three 
inputs  (K,  L,  Z)  based on the three input prices  (r,  w,  pZ).   
  We next consider briefly the case where each firm faces a restriction on its use of  
Z.  Pollution has no market clearing price  pZ,  but each firm with a restriction on  Z  can 
be said to face a shadow price  pZ.  Each firm gets an allocation of permits that are not 
tradable.  In our model with many identical firms, however, the firms cannot gain from 





allocation of nontradable permits in a way that is equivalent to the transfer of permits to 
some other firm using that same labor and capital.  In other words, firm-specific 
restrictions on pollution levels in this model yield the same results as we just derived for 
tradable permits.  Equations above can be used for effects on total dirty-industry use of 
labor and capital and for consequent economy-wide returns to labor and capital. 
5. “Performance Standard”: Emissions per unit Output 
  An alternative form of environmental policy is to limit the ratio of emissions to 
output, a policy we call a "performance standard".  With heterogeneous firm sizes, at 
least some consideration of this ratio seems necessary for a plausible policy.  A large 
producer cannot reasonably be expected to achieve the same limit on emissions as a small 
firm.  Considerations like these are also taken into account in other policies, such as a 
fixed number of tradable permits that are initially allocated according to market share.  If 
firm-specific emission limits are tied to the firm’s output level, even implicitly, then the 
policy may have no absolute limit on total emissions.  Instead, total emissions vary with 
total output in a way that affects incentives and prices.   
  This model uses the same production functions as the previous model.  Behavior 
in the clean sector is unchanged, with equations (1), (2), and (3).   Total capital and labor 
are still fixed by equations (8) and (9), and consumer preferences are unchanged in (10).  
The only changes involve incentives facing firms in the dirty sector.  Their behavior is: 
Z L K Y Y , ,
max    Y Y Y Y Y wL rK Z L K Y p − − ) , , (  
subject to the constraint   δ ≤ Y Z .  The firms pay no explicit price for the input  Z.  
Instead, their use of that input is limited by their output.  The constraint must bind, since 
the production function is monotone increasing in all inputs.  Solving the firms' first order 


















,  where subscripts 
on  Y  denote marginal products.  The firm does not set the marginal value of an input 
equal to the input price, as it would without the performance standard, because of the 
denominator in these two equations.  This denominator is less than one, so the marginal 
value of the factor is set lower than its input price.  In other words, the firm wants to 
proceed further down its factor demand curves, using more labor and capital in order to 





  Tighter regulation means a decrease in  δ.  Totally differentiating the production 
function yields an equation analogous to (6) in the previous model: 
   , (6')  Z L K Y Y YL Y YK ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ν ν θ ν θ + − + − =
where   Z Y δ ν ≡ = YZZ/Y.  In the prior model with (6), an increase in a factor would raise 
output in proportion to its factor share.  Now, since the marginal product of each factor is 
reduced by  (1 – ν),  its marginal contribution to output is reduced by  (1 – ν).  An 
increase in emissions  Z  raises output in proportion to  ν = δYZ,  to reflect its marginal 
product  YZ  and its factor share  δ = Z/Y.   Emission rights are valuable, of course, but 
firms do not pay for them through an explicit price.  Instead, they pay for emission rights 
by paying factors more than their marginal products.  
  The assumptions of perfect competition and free entry/exit lead to a zero profit 
condition in the previous model.  This condition remains under the policy specified here, 
though it takes a different form.  Since costs no longer include the price of emission 
permits, the final term in equation (7) is dropped.  The zero profit condition thus implies 
   . (7')  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ Y YL Y YK Y L w K r Y p + + + = + θ θ
The constraint may impose a “shadow price” on the factor  Z,  but since no explicit price 
is paid for that input, it is not included in the profits equation.
20
  Finally, we must replace equations (4) and (5) with their counterparts under the 
new policy.  Input demand equations can no longer be functions of output and three 
explicit input prices  (r,  w,  pZ).  Instead, we write input demand equations as functions 
of  r,  w,  δ, and  Y.   Then totally differentiate these equations to get: 
Y b w b r b K KZ KL KK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = δ  
Y b w b r b L LZ LL LK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = δ  
Y b w b r b Z ZZ ZL ZK ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = δ . 
Notice that the  bij appear in a form similar to the aij parameters in (4) and (5).  They both 
represent input demand elasticities.  For example, either  aKL or  bKL is the percent change 
in capital for a one percent change in the wage.  However,  aKL  is that response in the 
                                                 
20 This alters the dynamic of firm entry and exit, but since our concern is general equilibrium effects and 





first model holding  pZ  and  Y  constant (so  Z  can change), while  bKL  is that response in 
the model holding  δ  and  Y  constant (so  Z = δY  cannot change).
21   
  The third equation giving the input demand for  Z  can be simplified greatly.  We 
know that the constraint binds, so  Z = δY.  Then total differentiation yields: 
   , (5')  Y Z ˆ ˆ ˆ + =δ
which implies that  bZK = bZL = 0, and  bZZ = 1.  Since only two of the three equations are 
independent, we subtract the second equation from the first and get 
   , (4')  δ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ b w b r b L K w r Y Y + + = −
where  br ≡  bKK – bLK,  bw ≡ bKL – bLL,  and  bδ ≡ bKZ – bLZ.  In Appendix A1, we derive 
expressions for the  bij  elasticities in terms of  eij  and other parameters.  Both  bKK  and  
bLL  are negative, since increasing the price of a factor decreases its demand, even with 
the constraint on  δ=Z/Y.  The Appendix also shows that the cross-price  bij  are positive  
(i,j = K,L), whether or not capital and labor are substitutes as defined by the sign of the 
Allen cross-price elasticity.
22  Thus, in (4'), a higher wage increases the capital/labor ratio 
(bw > 0), and higher price of capital reduces it (br < 0).  In fact, the Appendix shows that  
br = –bw.   Finally, it shows that  bδ ≡ bKZ – bLZ  has the opposite sign of  eKZ – eLZ.  A 
tighter regulation means  δ  is decreased, and less pollution is allowed per unit output.  If 
capital is a better substitute for pollution than is labor, that is, if  eKZ > eLZ,  then more 
capital must be used relative to labor  (bKZ < bLZ , and hence  bδ  is negative). 
  For this model we now have ten equations: (1), (2), (3), (4'), (5'), (6'), (7'), (8), (9), 
and (10).  As before, we set   0 ˆ = X p  and solve for the changes in returns to capital and 
labor attributable to a small change in the policy variable (δ).  The solutions are presented 
in Table 2.  Compared to the general solutions in Table 1, these equations are not as 
complicated.  First, the denominator  D  is positive-definite.  Second, expressions for  r ˆ  
and     can be decomposed into three terms, each corresponding to a single effect.  The  w ˆ
                                                 
21 The  bij  elasticities (and the  cij  elasticities from the following section) are conceptually similar to the 
direct and indirect substitution effects of Ogaki (1990). 
22 Why is complementarity ruled out in this case?  The Allen elasticities are defined for the input demand 
functions where all inputs are allowed to vary.  Raising the price of labor  w  may then decrease the demand 
for capital, if the two inputs are complements, but the firm would be forced to increase its other input, 
pollution.  Here, however, the third input demand equation  ( )  indicates that a change in  w,  
with no change in  δ  or  Y,  cannot change  Z.  Only labor and capital can vary, so they must be substitutes. 





last term is the "substitution effect", since it involves  bδ ≡ bKZ – bLZ  (which has the 
opposite sign of  eKZ – eLZ).  A reduction in  δ=Z/Y  raises  r  if capital is better than labor 
as a substitute for emissions (eKZ > eLZ).  The second term is the "output effect" including  
σu(γK – γL).  This effect hurts capital  if  Y  is capital intensive.  Here, however, the first 
term is a new effect we call an "output-subsidy effect": since the policy mandates a lower 
ratio of pollution to output, it can be satisfied partially by increasing output – which helps 
the factor used intensively.
23   
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  Note that the first two terms have opposite signs and differ only by the appearance 
of  σu  in the output effect.  Thus, the usual output effect dominates only when  σu >1, 
which raises an important question about the likely size of  σu.  This parameter has never 
been estimated for this particular aggregation, where the "dirty good" could represent a 
composite of gasoline, heating fuel, electricity, and all goods that make intensive use of 
fossil fuels.  Yet all of these goods are usually found to have relatively low demand 
elasticities, which would imply that  σu  is less than one.  If so, then the new "output 
subsidy effect" found here dominates the usual output effect, and tighter environmental 
policy places less burden on the factor that is used intensively in the dirty sector. 
                                                 
23 In fact, the restriction on  Z/Y  could be modeled as a combination of a tax on emissions plus subsidy to 
output, which might be more consistent with the usual studies of incentive policies.  We choose to model 
mandates directly as quantity constraints, however, for several reasons.  First, they are quantity constraints.  
Second, these mandates do not raise revenue, so the equivalent incentive policy combination would require 
a complicated calculation of the endogenous output subsidy rate necessary to return all revenue from the 
emissions tax.  Third, we want specifically to see what insights can be obtained by tackling the problem of 





  For three reasons, this paper omits a section to assign numerical parameter values.  
First, Fullerton and Heutel (2007) already provide plausible parameter values that readers 
can insert into formulas here.
24  Second, however, parameter values are unnecessary.  
The relative impact of these two effects depends entirely on the size of  σu, which is 
plausibly less than one.  Third, numerical values would sidetrack readers from our main 
point, which is purely conceptual.  We have identified a new effect that likely reverses 
the usual output effect, and it indicates the importance of further research to estimate  σu. 
  In the equation for   in Table 2, the last term is a "direct effect" that raises the 
price of the dirty good.  Again, however, the "indirect effect" is ambiguous.  It is 
complicated by the fact that producers have incentive to sell more of this good, to qualify 
for more pollution rights.  In this case, the ambiguity can be resolved in special cases. 
Y p ˆ
5.1 Equal Factor Intensities 
  Since the output effect and output-subsidy effect operate through differential 
factor intensities, the assumption  γK = γL = γ  makes them both disappear.  Then only the 
third term for the substitution effect remains in r ˆ and  .  The solutions reduce to:  w ˆ
δ
γ σ


























= Y p . 
  In this case, the factor that is a relative substitute for pollution is burdened less by 
a strengthening of environmental policy ( ).  If labor is the better substitute for 
pollution  (b
0 ˆ < δ
δ > 0), then the wage rises and the return to capital falls.
25  This case also 
provides unambiguous results for incidence on the uses side of income.  Only the "direct 
effect" remains in the expression for  .  A tightening of environmental policy increases 
the price of the dirty good, hurting those who buy more than average amounts of it. 
Y p ˆ
                                                 
24 For example, industries that pollute more tend to be capital-intensive (Antweiler et. al. 2001, p. 879).  
Also, some estimates of production functions suggest that capital may be a better substitute for pollution 
than is labor (DeMooij and Bovenberg 1998, Considine and Larson 2006). 





5.2 No Substitution Effect in Dirty Sector 
  As we did with the previous policy, we can isolate the effect of factor intensities 
by assuming away differential substitution.  Before, we set all  aij  to zero, but here we set 
only  bδ  to zero.
26  Hence, the substitution effect is eliminated.  Then solutions reduce to: 
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  In the first two expressions, we combine the "output effect" and the "output-
subsidy effect" from Table 2.  If the dirty sector is capital intensive, so that  (γK – γL) > 0, 
then capital is hurt more than labor only if  σu  is greater than one.  This special case does 
not remove the ambiguity in   however.  Y p ˆ
 












Quantity  Z  eKZ – eLZ (γL – γK)    
Ratio  Z/Y  eKZ – eLZ (γL – γK) (γK – γL)  
Ratio  Z/KY eKZ – eLZ (γL – γK) (γK – γL)  eKL – eKK
                a The effect on the wage rate always has the opposite sign. 
 
 
  All of the effects in this paper are summarized in Table 3.  For the policy in each 
row, the sign of the term in each cell indicates the sign of that column's effect on the rate 
of return to capital,  r.  Because all of these policies restrict  Z  in some fashion, the 
substitution effect in the first column always raises  r  if capital is better than labor as a 
substitute for emissions (eKZ > eLZ).   The output effect always raises  r  if the impacted 
sector is labor intensive (γL > γK).  Those two effects follow Harberger (1962) and 
                                                 





Mieszkowski (1967), and they still pertain to all mandates here.  Yet this section has 
analyzed a restriction in emissions per unit of output (Z/Y) and found an "output-subsidy 
effect".  It raises  r  if the impacted sector is capital intensive.  The next section analyzes 
a restriction of emissions per unit of capital (Z/KY), and it identifies another new effect. 
6. “Technology Mandate”: Emissions per unit Input  
  Whereas the previous section examines a limit on emissions per unit output, we 
now examine a regulation that limits emissions per unit of an input.  Such limits are 
common, as described in our first section above.  We have only two clean inputs in our 
model, so we capture the nature of a limit on emissions per unit input by modeling a limit 
on emissions per unit of capital.  We refer to this policy as a "technology mandate", since 
forcing the adoption of a particular technology in production may effectively fix the 
emissions/capital ratio.  Capital and labor are each in fixed supply and mobile between 
sectors, so they are perfectly symmetric in this model.  Thus, the results for a limit per 
unit labor can be obtained directly from results below by interchanging every  K  and  L  
(as well as every w  and  r). 
  As with other policies considered earlier, the equations that describe the behavior 
of consumers and of producers of the clean good do not change here.  Equations (1), (2), 
(3), (8), (9), and (10) fall into this category and are applicable to this section.  The only 
aspect of the model that requires revision is the behavior of producers of the dirty good.  
Consider their maximization problem.  As in the previous policy considered, firms pay no 
explicit price for the pollution input.  Instead, they face an exogenous ceiling on their 
ratio of emissions to capital.  Formally, this problem is 
Z L K Y Y , ,
max    Y Y Y Y Y wL rK Z L K Y p − − ) , , (  
subject to the constraint  Z/KY  ≤ ζ.  A tightening of environmental policy is defined as a 
decrease in  ζ.  It is clear that the policy constraint binds: since firms pay no price per unit 
of pollution, and this input is productive, they will employ as much of it as possible, an 
amount  Z = ζKY.  Thus, we use below the fact that  ∂Z/∂KY = ζ.  The first order 
conditions for the maximization problem are 
r = pY(YK + ζYZ) 
w = pYYL. 





original problem where firms face a price for all three inputs and no other constraint:  the 
marginal value of labor is equal to the wage.  The first equation differs from the standard 
condition.  For the choice of capital input demanded, the marginal value of capital  YK  is 
lower than the rental rate (since  ζYZ  is positive).  The intuition here is that each unit of 
capital employed gives value to the firm in two ways.  First, it increases their output 
directly (since  YK > 0).  Second, it allows more pollution, which also increases output.  
The second term represents this effect, since  YZ  is the marginal product of pollution and  
ζ = ∂Z/∂KY  is the pollution increase made possible by the increased capital.  The value of 
investing in a marginal unit of capital is composed of these two terms and at the optimum 
is set equal to the cost of that investment, the rental rate  r.  
  Totally differentiate the production function and substitute in these first order 
conditions.  After dividing through by  Y,  we have: 
      (6'')  Z L K Y Y YL Y YK ˆ ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ ν θ ν θ + + − =
The constant  ν  is still equal to  YZ·Z/Y,  as in the previous section.  Also, as before, an 
increase in any one input does not generally increase output by a proportion equal to its 
factor share.  This condition does hold for labor in (6''), since that input choice is not 
distorted, but the constraint does distort the choice of capital.  Yet, from (6''), we see that 
a one percent increase in all three inputs yields a one percent increase in output, from the 
assumption of constant returns to scale.  The zero profit condition still holds as well, even 
though firms do not pay for pollution, because entry and exit are still allowed.  Thus 
equation (7') from the prior model also applies to this one.  
  Finally, the dirty sector’s chosen amount of each input (KY, LY, and  Z) depends on 
input prices, the policy parameter, and output  (r, w, ζ, and  Y).  We totally differentiate 
these input demand equations to get: 
Y c w c r c K KZ KL KK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = ζ  
Y c w c r c L LZ LL LK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = ζ  
Y c w c r c Z ZZ ZL ZK ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = ζ . 
The elasticity of demand for input  i  with respect to price  j  is defined here as  cij  (but 
this response depends on the nature of the constraint, so the  cij  elasticities are not the 





                                                
other, so we subtract each of the bottom two equations from the top one to get two 
equations to use in our solution.  The first of these equations is 
   , (4'')  ζ ζ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ c w c r c L K w r Y Y + + = −
where  cr ≡ cKK – cLK,  cw ≡ cKL – cLL,  and  cζ ≡ cKZ – cLZ.  The second resulting equation 
can be simplified using the policy constraint  Z/KY = ζ ,  since total differentiation gives:   
   . (5'')  ζˆ ˆ ˆ − = − Z KY
Substituting this into the equations above implies that  cKK – cZK = 0,  cKL – cZL = 0,  and  
cKZ – cZZ = –1.  These relationships are verified in Appendix A2. 
  Also in that Appendix, we evaluate the elasticities of input demand.  An important 
condition for their signs relates to the relative complementarity of capital and pollution: 
"Condition 2":     eKZ > (eKK + eZZ)/2. 
The right hand side of this inequality must be negative, since all own-price elasticities are 
negative.  This condition always holds, then, when capital and pollution are substitutes  
(eKZ > 0).  It also holds when capital and pollution are not "too complementary".  With 
this condition, the Appendix shows that  cr < 0  and  cw > 0.  That is, an increase in the 
capital rental rate must reduce the ratio  KY/LY  demanded, and an increase in the wage 
must increase it.  The ratio of  Z  to  KY  is fixed, and so producers really have only two 
inputs between which they can substitute; once they choose  KY  and  LY,  then  Z  is given 
by the constraint.  With only two inputs  KY  and  LY,  they must be substitutes.
27
  The system of equations containing (1), (2), (3), (4''), (5''), (6"), (7'), (8), (9), and 
(10) are ten equations in ten unknowns.  In Table 4, these equations are solved for the 
proportional change in each price from an exogenous change in  ζ.  When Condition 2 
holds, the denominator  D  must be positive.  
These equations are strikingly similar to their counterparts for the previous policy.  
As before, the second term in either factor price equation is an "output effect": this policy 
impinges on the dirty sector, which tends to raise the output price and discourage 
 
27 If condition 2 fails, then  eKZ < (eKK + eZZ)/2 < 0,  so  cr > 0  and  cw < 0.  Counterintuitively, an increase 
in  r/w  then raises the desired  KY/LY  ratio.  Because capital and pollution are highly complementary, the 
increase in  r  makes firms want less  K  and less  Z.  Wanting less  Z  reduces the pressure of the constraint 
(Z/KY ≤ ζ), which reduces the shadow price on  Z  (i.e., the right to emit is not so valuable).  The reduced 
shadow price on  Z  by itself would mean more demand for  Z  and more  KY,  since they are complements.  





purchases.  By itself, this effect would hurt capital if the sector is capital intensive.  Again 
the first term is an "output-subsidy effect" with the opposite sign.  Again it is larger than 
the output effect if  σu < 1.  In the prior case, however, the output-subsidy effect arises 
because the mandate to reduce  Z/Y  provides an implicit subsidy to output.  Why is 
output subsidized here?  As we show in a moment, this mandate to reduce Z/KY  provides 
an implicit subsidy to the use of capital  KY,  but this subsidy itself also reduces the cost 
of production, and it therefore also has an output-subsidy effect in the first term.  
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  The third term in these factor price equations depends on  cζ,  which Appendix A2 
shows can itself be subdivided.  In particular, it shows that  cζ  can be written as: 
) ( ) ( KL KK KZ LZ e e H e e H M c − + − + = ζ  
where M  and  H  are both defined in the Appendix and are both positive under Condition 
2.  In this expression, the last term is the promised "capital-subsidy effect":  it includes 
eKK,  which is always negative, so the policy ( < 0)  has a positive effect on the use of 
capital and its return  r.  It also includes  –e
ζˆ
KL, which operates in the same direction if 
labor and capital are substitutes  (eKL>0).  The extent to which dirty firms can substitute 
away from labor and into capital helps drive up demand for  K,  and thus the return  r.   
As shown in Table 3, the capital-subsidy effect raises  r  if  ) ( KL KK e e −  < 0. 
  The second term in the  cζ  expression represents the usual "substitution effect": 





                                                
numerator, which means substituting from  Z  into other inputs (K  or  L).   If labor is a 
better substitute for pollution than is capital  (eLZ > eKZ),  then this policy induces more 
demand for labor than capital from the substitution effect.  Then this term is positive, so 
multiplication by  <0  means that it decreases  r  and increases  w.  ζˆ
  In summary, the forced reduction in  Z/KY  can be satisfied partly by reducing 
emissions in the numerator (the substitution effect) but also partly by increasing capital in 
the denominator (the capital-subsidy effect).  This implicit subsidy itself reduces the cost 
of production (the output-subsidy effect), which offsets the usual way in which 
regulations raise costs (the output effect).  All four effects appear in Table 3. 
6.1 Equal Factor Intensities 
  The assumption  γK = γL = γ  eliminates the two output effects in Table 4.  The 
factor price equations do not need to be repeated here, as they then contain only the third 
term with  cζ  (including both the substitution effect and the capital-subsidy effect).  
However, the output price equation reduces to:   
ζ ν ˆ ˆ − = Y p . 
  On the uses side, incidence is unambiguous.  A tighter environmental policy must 
increase the price of the dirty good relative to the price of the clean good – due to the 
direct effect of the policy on the cost of production in the  Y  sector only.  
6.2 No Substitution Effect in Dirty Sector 
  Here we assume that  cr = cw = cζ = 0,  which is not quite as strong as saying that 
the dirty sector cannot substitute at all.
28  Instead, this assumption eliminates the capital-
subsidy effect and the substitution effect.  The remaining factor price equations are 
straight from Table 4, but without the last term (cζ).  Thus, they still include the output 
effect, and the output-subsidy effect.   
  The output price equation also looks much like the one in Table 4, but without the  
cζ  term.  The last term (–ν)  is definitely negative, so this "direct effect" raises the cost of 
production and thus raises the breakeven price  pY.  The long first term is an indirect 
effect.  Since  γK – γL  has the same sign as (θYKθXL – θYLθXK), this term has the opposite 
sign of  (1 – σu).  When  σu  is smaller than one, then a tighter mandate must increase the 
 





                                                
price of good  Y.  When  σu  is large, however, the indirect effect can dominate the direct 
effect, so that a tighter mandate decreases the price of the dirty good.
29
7. Conclusion  
  Just like taxes, regulations that restrict emissions affect producer decisions about 
use of labor and capital, and they thus affect relative factor prices, total production, and 
output prices.  Existing models analyze the distribution of burdens from taxes, but this 
paper points out that non-revenue raising restrictions also have burdens on the sources 
side of income through changes in factor prices as well as burdens on the uses side 
through changes in output prices.  Our model is based on the standard two-sector tax 
incidence model, but with two important modifications.  First, we allow one sector to 
include pollution as a factor of production that can be a complement or substitute for 
labor or for capital.  Second, we look not at taxes but at four types of mandates.   
  The model in this paper can be applied beyond environmental policy to analyze 
any regulation that restricts use of inputs.  Alternatively, the model could be extended in 
any of the many ways that the Harberger model has been extended, for example to 
consider increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, international trade, or capital 
mobility.  Future research could consider capital formation, endogenous technology, and 
uncertainty.  Also important is the interaction of environmental mandates with other 
types of regulation, especially in the highly regulated electric utility sector.   
  With any of those extensions, the model would become more complicated, and 
the price change equations might have more terms.  But the effects we have uncovered 
here would still pertain.  With no existing research on this topic at all, we believe that this 
simple model is the right place to begin.  And even in this simple model, we get some 
interesting results.  First, a mandate may hurt consumers of the clean good more than 
consumers of the dirty good.  Second, we show how a mandate may burden either the 
factor that is a better substitute for pollution or the factor that is a relative complement to 
pollution.  Third, restrictions on the absolute level of emissions differ from restrictions on 
emissions per unit output or per unit of an input.  A restriction on pollution per unit of 
output has not only an "output effect" that burdens any factor used intensively in 
 
29 In the   equation, for a large indirect effect, suppose  σ Y p ˆ u  and  (γK – γL)  are large.  The sector is highly 
capital intensive.  The output effect dominates the output-subsidy effect, so the tighter mandate means less 
demand for capital.  Thus  r  falls.  As seen in the r ˆ equation, large  σu  and  (γK – γL) mean  r  falls a lot.  





production, but also an "output-subsidy effect" that encourages output to help satisfy the 
mandated ratio.  Similarly, a restriction on pollution per unit capital creates a "capital-
subsidy effect" that increases demand for capital and thus raises the rental rate. 
  An implication is that researchers need to be careful about the nature of an 
environmental restriction before concluding that it injures the factor used intensively or 
the factor that is a better substitute for pollution.  Those usual effects can be completely 
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Appendix A1: Finding the Substitution Elasticities  bij
 The    bij  elasticities are evaluated from the production function in the dirty sector 
in a manner analogous to Allen (1938, p. 505-508).  We are solving for the derivatives of 
input demands with respect to changes in either input prices or  δ,  the policy parameter.  
These input demand equations come from the firm’s cost minimization problem, where 
the total quantity to be produced is exogenous.  First consider a small change in the price 
of capital,  dr.  If we differentiate the production function with respect to  r  we get 
















where the last equation comes from the fact that total output demanded is exogenous and 
not a function of the rental rate.   
  The first order condition of the minimization problem with respect to the choice 
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,  with respect to  r  and rearrange to get 





















L ξ ξ ξ . 
Note that the right hand side of this equation is zero, since a change in  r  has no effect on  
w,  which is exogenous to this input demand system.  Finally, the policy constraint binds, 
so  Z = δY.  Since  Y  and  δ  are both exogenous variables in the input demand system, a 
change in  r  has no effect on their values.  Hence, differentiating this equation with 








  Writing these four equations in matrix form allows use of Cramer’s rule to 


























































ZZ L LZ ZL L LL ZK L LK L










ξ Y Y Y ξ Y Y Y ξ Y Y Y Y
ξ Y Y Y ξ Y Y Y ξ Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y
 
Follow the notation of Allen (1938) and use  F  to denote the determinant of the bordered 
Hessian of the production function, and use  Fij  to denote the cofactor of element  i,j  of 
that matrix.  The determinant of the matrix of coefficients in the above equation 
simplifies to  FZZ  (the terms with  ξ  all cancel each other out).  With an odd number of 
inputs, the assumption of constant returns to scale (linear homogeneity) implies that  F < 
0  and  FZZ > 0.  Using Cramer’s rule, we solve for the derivatives of interest:   
0























These sign indicate that  bKK < 0  and  bLK > 0,  as we now show.  The term  1 – δYZ  is 
strictly positive for the following reason.  The policy parameter  δ = Z/Y  is the inverse of 
average output per unit of  Z.  It is multiplied by  YZ,  the marginal output per unit of Z.  
Since production is constant returns to scale, the average output must exceed the marginal 
output, and hence  δYZ < 1.  Furthermore, both first derivatives of  Y  are positive, and  
FZZ < 0  as mentioned before.  Thus  bKK < 0  and  bLK > 0.  
  We take the production function, the first order conditions for the cost 
minimization problem, and the binding constraint, and then we differentiate all, this time 
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. 
The matrix of coefficients is the same as for  dr  above; the only difference is in which 





differentiation of the first order condition for labor input, since  w  is changing.  Solving 
this system yields 
0
F p
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We can substitute in the first order conditions  pYYK = r(1 – δYZ)  and  pYYL = w(1 – δYZ)   



























b + = . 
This substitution demonstrates that  br = -bw.   
  Lastly, we want to find the derivatives of factor demands with respect to a change 
in the policy parameter  δ.  Again, differentiate the production function and the first order 
conditions, here with respect to  δ.  The policy constraint  (Z = δY)  differentiated with 
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. 
Again the matrix of coefficients is the same, with determinant  FZZ.  Solving for the 





















where again  Fij  denotes the cofactor of element  i,j  in the bordered Hessian of the 
production function.  These cofactors are not immediately interpretable, but they are an 













ij ⋅ ≡ ,  where  iY  is the quantity of input  i  used.  With these definitions we can 
calculate the remaining input demand elasticities: 


















b b b − = − = − =
δ δ δ
δ , 
where  eij  is the Allen elasticity of substitution between inputs  i  and  j.  Since  F/FZZ < 
0,  the sign of  bδ  is opposite the sign of  eKZ – eLZ;  if capital is a better substitute for 
pollution than is labor, then  bδ  is negative.  
Appendix A2: Finding the Substitution Elasticities  cij
  We calculate these elasticities using a method similar to the one in Appendix A1.  
First, consider the effect of small changes in the capital rental rate.  If we differentiate the 
production function with respect to  r  we get, as before:  
















The first order condition from the maximization problem with respect to capital is  r = 
pY(YK + ζYZ).  Differentiate this with respect to  r,  divide through by  pY,  and rearrange 




























The first order condition for labor is  w = pYYL.  Differentiating this equation by  r  and 
similarly rearranging yields 
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Combining these four equations into matrix form allows us to solve for any of the 
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. 
  We solve for these derivatives using Cramer’s Rule, where the denominator is the 
determinant of the matrix of coefficients.  Call this denominator  D.  Solving along the 
bottom row, and using known properties of determinants, we get: 
KZ ZZ KK KZ ZZ KK KZ F F F F F F F D ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ 2 )) ( ( )) ( (
2 + − − = − + − − + = , 
where the  Fij  notation is from Allen (1938), just as in the previous section.  We can 
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D + − − = . 
We can sign the denominator with information about these three Allen elasticities.  The 
ratio in the front of this expression is negative, since  F < 0  and all of the other constants 
are positive.  The own-price elasticities  eKK  and  eZZ  must be negative.  Hence,  D  is 
negative if and only if  eKZ  is not too negative: 








Since the right hand side of this inequality is strictly negative, a sufficient condition for  
D  to be negative is capital and pollution are substitutes in production  (eKZ  >0).   
However,  D  is still negative if  K  and  Z  are not too complementary. 
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When  D < 0,  then  dKY/dr < 0  and  dLY/dr > 0.  We can also use Cramer’s rule to solve 





  Now, we solve for the elasticities  cKK  and  cLK,  and the difference (which is 
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The sign of  cr  is thus equal to the sign of  D.   
  The same method is used to solve for the derivatives with respect to  w  and  ζ.  
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. 
The denominator again is  D.  Solving for the derivatives gives: 
 
Y




dK ) ( 1 ζ +







2 ) ( 1 ζ +
= . 









































The sign of  cw  is the opposite of the sign of  D. 
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The difference on the right hand side comes from the fact that, when differentiating with 













Y + = ,  the bottom row of 
the matrix equation.   
  The denominator is the same as in earlier cases.  Solving for the derivatives gives: 
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The first derivative above consists of two offsetting terms whenever capital and pollution 
are substitutes, since  D < 0,  FKZ < 0,  and  FKK > 0.  Therefore, when policy is tightened 
and  ζ  falls, then demand for capital may fall or rise.  The sign of the derivative of labor 
demand with respect to  ζ  is also ambiguous.  It depends on both  D  and the relative 















ZL ZK − ≡ − ≡   Solving for the elasticity   ,  we get: 
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≡ The constants     and     are both positive 
when Condition 2 holds (D < 0), because  F < 0  and all first derivatives of the production 
function  Y ,  Y ,  and  Y   are positive.  K L Z
  Finally, the text uses three relationships  cKK – c  = 0,  c ZK KL – c  = 0,  and  c ZL KZ – 
c  = -1.  These can be verified using the derivations of the appropriate elasticities.  ZZ